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Abstract: 
This article sounds a cautionary note about the instrumental use of celebrity advocacy to 
(re)engage audiences in public life. It begins by setting out the steps necessary to achieve public 
recognition of a social problem requiring a response. It then presents empirical evidence which 
suggests that those most interested in celebrity, while also paying attention to the main stories 
of the day, are also least likely to participate in any form of politics. However, this does not rule 
out the possibility of forging a link between celebrity and public engagement, raising questions 
about what would potentially sustain such an articulation. After discussing the broader cultural 
context of celebrity advocacy in which perceived authenticity functions valorised form of 
symbolic capital, the article outlines a phenomenological approach to understanding the uses 
audiences make of celebrity advocacy, using the example of a Ewan McGregor UNICEF appeal 
for illustration. It concludes that while media encounters with celebrities can underpin a 
viewer’s sense of self, this is as likely to lead to the rationalisation of inaction as a positive 
response to a charity appeal. 
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1. Introduction: The laboriousness of issue recognition 
The starting point of this article is that, whatever we might think politically or morally about 
celebrity advocacy, recent evidence (Thrall et al., 2008) suggests in fairly strong terms that it 
does not work. It has certainly become a central plank of many if not most campaigns for social 
justice and humanitarian aid, but it does little to raise awareness in any way that leads to public 
engagement in and tangible support for an issue. The aim of the article is to explain this efficacy 
gap by focussing on the complicit, learned but instinctive relation that can exist between a 
celebrity and her followers, as well as media consumers’ well-honed ability to 
compartmentalise this relationship and filter out dissonant or difficult messages. Issue advocacy 
is hard work, and it is not difficult to see why celebrities are enlisted to lubricate the machinery 
of public relations campaigns for humanitarian or social justice issues. The most profound 
obstacle is that no social problems simply exist (Best, 2007). There are phenomena that occur 
and are experienced, but for any of these to be widely recognised as a problem requiring 
intervention is not as straightforward as it sounds. For Best, the first principle of issue 
recognition is that it cannot be magicked out of thin air: it has to fit with established narratives 
of concern, justice and fear. Newspaper journalists know this well: announcing a new moral 
panic requires a lot of groundwork, and it only succeeds if there are buttons in place to press. 
Some, like road rage or satanic abduction, are short-lived in the public’s memory, while others 
such as the more recent ‘meow meow’ (mephedrone) ‘legal high’ hype1 had to overcome a lot of 
scepticism. This is no doubt due in part to the lessons learned from previous scandals, 
exaggerations and outright hoaxes – in the case of singer Phil Collins’ appearance on current 
affairs satire programme The Day Today to front a confected anti-paedophilia campaign called 
‘Nonce Sense’. Angela McRobbie (1995), meanwhile, notes that even when the requisite folk 
devil has a self-interest in spreading new recognition of a new social ‘problem’, as is often the 
case with youth cultures that self-identify through their perceived transgressions of social 
norms, success is not guaranteed: the rave generation made several attempts at notoriety 
before being taken seriously. 
The upshot is that there needs to be fertile ground for celebrity advocates to work with: an 
established fear, or a predisposition towards compassion when confronted with poverty, 
disease or injustice. I have argued elsewhere (Markham, 2011) that it matters little if that 
compassion is genuine, learned or essentially performative – even if audiences are motivated by 
competitive compassion, the outcome may well be the same. But conformity to established 
categories is a constraining factor, and Milan Kundera amongst others has noted our inability to 
pay attention to more than a couple of the same ‘kind’ of issue or crisis at any one time (Moeller, 
1999: 10-11). Further, while it is fair to point to our susceptibility to compassion fatigue 
(Moeller, 1999), it can be countered countered that awareness of issues can also be raised by 
associating them with others: other research (Markham, 2011) suggests that commitments to 
causes comes in clusters, that you are more likely to care about Syria if you have a pre-existing 
interest in Palestine, or that you are more likely to respond to campaigns against female genital 
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mutilation if violence against women is already on your radar. From the perspective of the 
budding celebrity advocate, it appears that in order to be taken seriously the main pitfall to 
avoid is dilettantism: Bono has shown the dangers of popping up in too many dispersed 
advocacy contexts; Clooney just about works in Sudan because of a less scattergun track record. 
It is a fine line and audiences are fickle, though it helps if we understand what function aligning 
oneself has to a cause serves for media consumers: in short, it helps them to position themselves 
socially (e.g., as compassionate), and positioning is easier to achieve in relation to coherent sets 
of issues rather than in response to prompts from unexpected sources. 
Joel Best sets out four other elements that need to be established in order for something to be 
recognised as a problem requiring action. Nominalisation – a widely recognised label for an 
issue that serves as shorthand – is essential, and here it is likely that celebrities can be effective, 
alongside journalists and PR practitioners, in turning a conflict zone (‘Darfur’, say) or a 
humanitarian issue (‘blood diamonds’)  into a household name. Domain expansion can signify 
different processes. On the one hand it can mean the linking of an issue to larger, better 
established issues – an unsuccessful example being the association of film piracy to terrorism. 
But it can also mean a discursive expansion, and beyond the simple question of more people 
discussing an issue are ways of assessing its cultural purchase: when an issue moves beyond the 
confines of the news pages to gossip, fashion and the television listings – the kind of unboxing 
that seems well served by celebrity advocacy. Third, establishing any phenomenon as a social 
problem requiring remedial action relies on active campaigning: it is never enough just to 
present the facts, and a celebrity advocate cannot be successful without a tightly-drilled team of 
campaigners surrounding them. And fourthly, official actors cannot be ignored: celebrities 
cannot usually effect change of their own accord, but only by rallying or cajoling or shaming 
those in power to do so.  
However, even with all of these criteria fulfilled there remains the possibility of unintended 
consequences. Beyond the embarrassment of being duped, Collins demonstrated the risks faced 
by celebrities engaging in advocacy in terms of the mostly tacit rules of the field of celebrity 
culture. The first risk is the appearance of self-importance, which in certain corners of that field 
can constitute significantly negative symbolic capital. The second, I would argue, is the 
appearance of earnestness: while some celebrities have licence to be sincere, we return towards 
the end of this article to the notion that particularly in the UK a certain level of irony or 
reflexiveness is central to the audience’s experience of complicity with celebrities. We could put 
this simply in terms of the difficulty faced by any individual in transitioning from one field to 
another and finding that their symbolic capital is not recognised as currency in their new 
environment. But instead of thinking about this in strictly Bourdieusian terms (2005) as 
interaction or competition between two cultural fields with their own internal logics, it is worth 
considering how valorisation or devalorisation of behaviour proceeds outside of those logics – 
that is, value as conferred by audiences (Couldry, 2003). Although not a universal phenomenon, 
it appears that many media consumers have developed an extensive if largely unvoiced sense of 
the rules of the ‘game’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 66) in both celebrity and the world of social justice, and 
will be as quick to detect inappropriateness in celebrity incursions into humanitarian issues as 
they would to spot a politician’s doomed attempt to appear at home in the field of popular 
culture. None of this is to say that successful transitions are impossible, as many people’s gleeful 
response to actress Joanna Lumley’s belittling of a British MP in a press conference2 about the 
rights of Ghurkha soldiers proved. But it does suggest that in thinking about the usefulness of 
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celebrities we do not fully understand how audiences assess them, respond to them and make 
their own uses of them. 
 
2. Audience attitudes towards celebrity: lessons from the Media Consumption and 
the Future of Public Connection project 
What, then, does the evidence suggest? It is first worth reflecting on the empirical data garnered 
in the Media Consumption and the Future of Public Connection research project (See Couldry, 
Livingstone & Markham, 2007), which took both quantitative and qualitative forms. The 
quantitative data was hardly unequivocal, but it did suggest certain clear themes. The first is 
that around one in seven people can be defined as dedicated followers of celebrity, and that 
doing so does not come at the expense of following the main news items of the day – though it is 
certainly true that an interest in celebrity is largely mutually exclusive with, say, economics and 
international politics. The second was predictable and superficially dispiriting: that compared to 
the population at large, those in the ‘celebrity cluster’ were overwhelmingly female, young, 
likely to have low social capital and unlikeliest to vote. There was no question of ascribing 
causality in these findings, though it was interesting that this group of media consumers were 
also likely to have relatively high levels of trust in the media, and it would be tempting to 
speculate about the potential relationship between an absence of media criticality and a feeling 
of social disconnection. By no means did this lead the research down the “media consumption 
causes alienation” route: care was taken to avoid pathologising political inaction and 
inattention, and the qualitative component of the project identified a number of individuals who 
were happy living in a world without politics. Following Lisbet van Zoonen’s defence of the 
personalisation of politics (2005), the investigation also open to more or less any form of felt 
public connection, and wanted to know if there were articulations between media use and some 
kind of public space. While the survey data found that those engaged in celebrity culture are 
unlikely to participate in any form of public action (the threshold for this was set deliberately 
low, including signing a petition and changing consumer behaviour as evidence of action), there 
was also an interest in exploring the broader question of orientation, the stabilised set of 
contingent objects and values that underpin everyday experience (Couldry & Markham, 2007). 
One participant in the qualitative phase of the project, for instance, was a soccer fanatic, and 
used sport to connect to debates about morality and national identity. It is plausible then that 
audiences will use celebrity in order to think about and participate in wider discussions about 
public issues, however defined. 
And yet, the evidence suggested that while celebrities have many uses, they cannot easily be 
used instrumentally to further a particular cause. For a start, in the majority of cases it was 
perceived misbehaviour on the part of celebrities that led to incursions into debates or, more 
accurately, statements of position in various discourses. This was a few years ago, and criticisms 
of UK Big Brother contestant Jade Goody for apparently racist remarks was a popular way to 
demonstrate non-racist credentials. But it appears that a celebrity actively campaigning for 
racial equality or tolerance simply does not offer the same efficacy in terms of performance of 
identity. It is often been noted that Goody’s cancer diagnosis, like Kylie Minogue’s as well as 
Angelina Jolie’s preventative mastectomy, led to increased demand for screening, but this 
suggests that successful advocacy would inevitably be contingent on personal suffering. Beyond 
these issues of public offence and private suffering, interestingly, there was a fair amount of 
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resistance using celebrities’ private lives in order to demonstrate moral credentials. 
Speculations about the Beckhams’ marriage, for instance, was largely used to express disdain 
for others’ prurience and the general absence of ethical principles in the media, rather than to 
demonstrate an individual’s commitment to family and fidelity (“Why do we (the public) need to 
know what the Beckhams do with their private lives?”). This would indicate that private 
indiscretion does not necessarily undermine the scope for public advocacy, in line with the 
broader argument here that audiences make very specific demands of celebrities and are adept 
at separating their useful and extraneous functions. This in turn relates to the 
phenomenological question of recognition, to which we return to below. 
More often than not, though, participants in the project who expressed an interest in celebrity 
went out of their way to contextualise or qualify its importance in their lives. It is true that there 
is likely to be a performative element to this, not wishing to be seen as culturally inferior for 
taking celebrity seriously. But there is also a richness of ethnographic detail in how celebrity 
content functions as a source of pleasure, ranging from gleefulness rather than self-deprecation 
in describing the trashiness of celeb culture, to well thought-through discussions of how 
celebrity media form the basis of conversations at work – exchanges that seem to come with 
firmly established ground rules, namely a commitment to keeping up with what’s going on 
while ensuring that things never get too serious. It is this kind of structure and reflexivity about 
the way celebrity is used that compelled us to look carefully at the question of enjoyment, rather 
than seeing pleasure as the ‘mere’ alternative to substantive mediated public connection. 
Celebrity cluster respondents were on the whole quite clear about what they get out of it (“It is 
the whole car crash thing. It’s compelling”; “I do keep up to date with what's going on... mainly 
the gossipy side of the media, you know like Heat and Ok magazine, yes I get those every week. 
What girl isn’t in to that really?”), and did not appear receptive to being led by celebrities 
towards other more serious uses of this kind of media. We return later to the question of why 
this might be the case, and while it has been suggested here that it is in part being about 
audiences knowing what they want, it is also a matter of orientation. And that orientation – a 
knowing, complicit acknowledgement of the fundamental contingency of media, and yet a 
simultaneous investment in media despite that contingency – does not sit easily with a straight 
discussion of political or social issues. The ability to wear celebrity lightly is not simply a 
watered down version of ‘real’ mediated engagement but a mastery of a distinct set of practices, 
a mastery which demonstrates a cultural competence which is perhaps more about process 
than content, but also a way of restricting group membership to the initiated. 
It is important to recognise that this is distinct from the claim that celebrity advocacy is a non-
starter because we do not take celebrities seriously enough for them to be recognised as 
authorities in or gateways into public deliberation. While the Habermasian public sphere has 
been widely criticised (Fraser, 1990) for being overly rationalist, the position taken here is that 
the correct response is not simply to prioritise the opposite. Van Zoonen, for instance, argues 
that more attention should be paid to affect rather than facts, to the personal instead of the 
abstractly political, and John Fiske (1992) takes this argument to its logical conclusion by 
explicitly elevating the popular over the principled in terms of their democratic potential. 
However, both authors are aware that media orientations are much more subtle than this 
binary view allows. It is not a matter of arguing either that celebrity is simply too superficial to 
serve as a connection to ‘serious’ issues, nor that what the public sphere needs is exactly this 
kind of personalisation or popularisation. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the distinct 
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ways in which audiences relate to celebrities and to public issues. It is true that the logics 
underpinning these orientations are not compatible, but their differences cannot be reduced to 
seriousness versus pleasure. The orientation to celebrity is not just about amusement but an 
active calling forth to engage in a game whose rules are at once absurd and meaningful. It is 
perhaps too much of a cliché to avow that audiences consume celebrity culture ironically, but 
the point stands that there is a collective, knowing suspension of disbelief in the embrace of 
celebrity that does not fit the logic of public deliberation. Good faith in Habermas’s public 
sphere requires a goal-oriented belief in the possibility of rational resolution; engagement with 
celebrity culture necessitates a willingness to abandon oneself to the vicissitudes of whatever 
may come next. 
 
3. Cultures of authenticity 
It is worth at this point taking a brief step back to consider the broader context against which 
celebrities acting as spokespeople for causes and issues might be thought to make sense – that 
is, to be unproblematically recognisable as a potentially meaningful culture of practice. This is a 
context in which deference to professional, expert and institutional knowledge has been in long 
decline, with amateur and non-elite knowledge increasingly valorised as knowledge because of 
its perceived anti-establishment status (Sennett, 1973; MacIntyre, 1981). There is an elevated 
role then for the authenticity of personal experience (Chouliaraki, 2010), which can be argued 
to represent a form of democratisation, since no specialist training or professional status is 
needed to acquire it, but it can alternatively be seen as a kind of demotic turn, hollowing out 
formerly autonomous spaces of knowledge production and subjecting them to market 
principles of popularity (Bourdieu, 1994). One would think that celebrities would profit in such 
a symbolic economy, able as many are to project a seemingly knowable and certainly un-
professional identity that has none of the vested interests of those working within political 
bureaucracies or even the international aid circuit. And yet that transfer of status is not 
automatic. While there are some markers of authenticity that seem to function well – again, 
personal suffering is a good example – there are others, such as simply feeling really strongly 
about an issue and deciding to do something about it, which draw our attention to things that 
we do not usually talk about when enjoying the celebrity spectacle: implicitly, the rules 
governing the legitimacy of public status associated with some but by no means all forms of 
fame. There are readers of celebrity content online who praise individual celebrities (pop artist 
Lady Gaga, for instance) for playing the media game well, indicating that the suspension of 
disbelief does not go so far as denying the existence of a competitive entertainment industry. 
But it is at the point where audiences are alerted to the broader question of the relative social 
importance or influence of an individual celebrity that any thought of authenticity is potentially 
undermined. 
All of which would suggest that those who invest in celebrity culture want celebrities to know 
their place. This rather overstates the power that audiences have, and even feel they have, over 
celebrities – the debatable sense that we built you up, and we can pull you down, too. I would 
suggest that if there is an element of power in the pleasure audiences take from celebrities, it is 
one that comes without ownership. Instead, it is a more diffuse and distant spectating as the 
media judges on our behalf. There is an aspect of confessional culture about this, in the 
enjoyment derived from seeing celebrities bare their souls, but there is also confessionalism of a 
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Foucauldian nature (Dent, 2008): watching as the celebrity is repeatedly called forth and 
praised or criticised, a kind of voyeurism into what instinctively should take place in the privacy 
of the confession both. Perhaps the highest profile example of this phenomenon in recent years 
is the global success of the online version of British right-wing, mid-market newspaper the Daily 
Mail (www.dailymail.co.uk), its format a never-ending litany of small judgements about weight, 
style, relationship status and success. We could certainly speak of disciplinary discourse on the 
part of the audience as they make unthinking comparisons between their bodies and those on 
display in the Femail Today sidebar, but it is not the celebrities who have delegated authority in 
this context – even when being lauded for weight loss or landing a new man. This repetitive 
positioning of celebs according to a minefield of expectations and regulations is a pivotal 
characteristic of the field, and to attempt to step outside this judgement treadmill is regarded 
with suspicion. 
Before moving on to what might be called the phenomenology of celebrity consumption, it bears 
emphasising that a majority of participants in the qualitative phase of the Public Connection 
project were openly hostile to the phenomenon of celebrity culture. The performative aspect of 
this data gathering makes it difficult to tell how widespread genuine approbation is: whatever 
people say, a glance at the most read stories on the msnbc.com, abc.com.au or bbc.co.uk reveals 
at least significant interest in the lives of celebrities. But in the qualitative material in particular 
there are critical passages whose veracity is not in question: in one instance where a respondent 
feels palpably let down by his family’s and friends’ celebrity curiosity –  
“What I find quite astonishing really is that most people I know really just do not care 
about what’s going on. They’re focussed on their own thing and as long as they know 
that David Beckham’s got a new haircut and that they can go and get it done at the salon 
just like his … and they just carry on with stuff.” 
– and in several others where participants talk about the effect that celebrity culture is having 
on children and standards of public discourse: 
“I mean now you’re getting the contents of what goes in people’s bedrooms … if that’s 
going to be the case, then I mean there is no need for things like Eastenders, there is no 
need for the news, there is no need for anything because these are the celebrities … and 
we’re just going to watch them live out their lives like it’s a 24 hour thing … a great Big 
Brother, we’re just going to watch them have sex, we’re going to watch them eat their 
food, we’re going to watch them have affairs and mess up their lives. So where do you 
draw the line? I don’t know.” 
Interestingly, however, there are a few signs here that advocacy would not be entirely 
unwelcome: it is true that in the majority of cases celebrities are derided for presuming that 
anyone would be interested in their views on climate change or the Iraq war, but there are also 
moments where any potential embrace of the serious is seen as a step in the right direction. 
Next we turn to the potential democratic benefits of celebrity advocacy and its limitations in 
practice. 
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4. Thinking phenomenologically about celebrity advocacy 
If there is a democratic aspect to celebrity advocacy, it is important to set out which particular 
democratic principles are in play. Of the various options offered by conventional political 
theory, it would appear that representation is the likeliest candidate – meaning that what is 
most important in a democratic society is that as wide a range of issues and attitudes get a 
hearing in the public sphere or other deliberative spaces as possible. Beyond simply reflecting 
the concerns of the members of a society in a roughly proportionate manner, there is a principle 
of exposure at stake – the idea that there are issues which by and large a population is not 
concerned about, but certain individuals are authorised to argue that they should be concerned. 
Such authorisation is a knotty concept to delineate. We have culturally recognised groups such 
as war reporters whose role we accept is to bring issues to our attention that we had not 
previously acknowledged. I have argued elsewhere (Markham, 2011), however, that the 
recognition of authority in conflict journalism is only partly related to this duty to bear witness 
and also associated with conceivably anti-democratic phenomena such as elitism and 
esotericisation. Further, there is a split in this community between those who seek only 
representation of injustice and suffering, and those who actively campaign for political and 
humanitarian intervention in the regions they report from. The latter camp are perceived in a 
similar fashion to charity workers: it is not that they are seen as self-serving, but there is an 
awareness that their aim is to grab our attention, potentially at the expense of balance or 
neutrality. In research into humanitarian advertising campaigns Chouliaraki (2006) finds that 
audiences are quick to spot manipulation, and will resist messages seen as being sold too hard. 
We know that media in all its forms is motivated by attention-seeking, and Zengotita (2005) 
argues convincingly that in general we find this pleasurable: it is flattering, and we derive a 
certain satisfaction from bestowing our gaze upon this media form rather than that. Depriving 
us of that choice, on the other hand, provokes a response in which we attempt to reassert our 
agency by consciously redirecting our attention elsewhere. 
In Chouliaraki’s work this means that rather than being didactic, humanitarian advertising 
needs to invite the viewer in – an invitation which is given almost lightly, and centred upon a 
partial collapse of the distance of suffering so that it is neither othered or thrust in our faces but 
rather something which is meaningful in the context of our everyday lives. For present 
purposes, the question is whether celebrity advocates can perform the same role, making it 
easier for audiences to make the difficult transition from the phenomenal cocoon of quotidian 
experience to suffering or injustice which is not only beyond our ken but under normal 
circumstances, in the phenomenological sense, unknowable. And as such, this is the appropriate 
juncture at which to set out the phenomenological approach to celebrity advocacy. This is based 
on two parallel rejections, each of which offers a useful corrective to the sometimes simplistic 
way that we think about our relationship with media. Historically, conventional approaches 
focussed on content and the question of what effects the media has on its audiences, with the 
functionalist view looking at the overall impact on exposure to media (or specific genres) and 
instrumentalists, including social and humanitarian campaigners, asking how media can be 
designed to produce particular results  - such as donating to a cause. But this focus on the 
efficacy of media messages came under criticism from the 1970s onwards (Katz et al., 1973) 
based as it is on the misconception of media consumption as discrete moments rather than 
cumulative cultures of practice, and the broader fallacy that the media are somehow external to 
our subjectivity rather than something constitutive of it. Thus, as the familiar trope has it, media 
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theorists turned their attention away from what the media does to people and toward what 
people do with media.  
While there is room within this central question for a wide range of approaches, the dominant 
model in recent years has been hermeneutic (see, for instance, Moores, 2000; Bird, 2003; 
Coleman, 2010): seeking to understand how people experience media, preferably by asking 
them or observing them in their natural habitat rather than imposing theories about preferred 
readings, hegemony and cultural reproduction. For campaigners, this ethnographic 
epistemology of taking people at their word and believing what we observe reduces to a kind of 
market research: yes, audiences respond better to messages that acknowledge their essentially 
compassionate nature than guilt-tripping; they do not resent having new issues of injustice and 
suffering brought to their attention, but would prefer that it is not done in a manipulative or 
heavy-handed way. Presumably market research is a sophisticated enough art these days not to 
assume that simply asking people what they like and giving it to them is an effective means of 
raising awareness about social or humanitarian issues: to my knowledge, pornography has not 
yet been enlisted in the battle against poverty and injustice. And yet it does not appear complex 
enough to account for the sheer range of responses that audiences have to celebrity advocacy – 
sometimes indifferent, sometimes contradictory, potentially at the same time. Angelina Jolie 
seems to have just about maintained credibility in her work in Sudan, while Sting for all his 
efforts to preserve the rainforests of Brazil is commonly regarded as sanctimonious, Bono is 
‘smug’ despite or because of his campaigning for debt relief, and Richard Gere, while admired by 
some for campaigning for Tibetan independence is seen by others as anything from delusional 
to a CIA stooge (Markham, 2011). 
The phenomenological approach (see especially Bourdieu, 1990: 52-65; Bourdieu, 2000: 173; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 167; Goffman, 1972: 293; Fraser & Honneth, 2003; McNay, 2008) does 
not claim to be able to prevent any PR disasters a celebrity advocate might otherwise stumble 
into. But it is distinct from the ethnographic perspective in that it seeks to explain why 
audiences respond the way they do: usually instinctively, motivated by learned pleasure or 
simple habit and, especially, according to pre-dispositional orientations to the world that 
cultural producers can do little to shift. This means that audiences are primed to recognise 
things that have symbolic value, not so much because those things are important to them, but 
because the recognition of value is itself a valorised practice, one which allows them to position 
themselves relationally in a cultural space and thus engage in acts of subjectification. This last 
point could be taken in several directions but here it is meant in the existential sense of 
performing selfhood in the face of the self’s impossibility (see, for instance, Butler, 1990). If this 
sounds abstract, we can think back to one of the constituents of the conscious experience of 
selfhood: authenticity. The opening gambit for phenomenologists is that authenticity never just 
is, it is not something we have due to the fact of our existence, but something that has to be 
learned, performed and recognised. And one of the ways it is recognised is through the learned 
and then instinctive recognition of inauthenticity in observed behaviour – smugness, say, or 
sanctimony. This is not to make grand claims about the distaste for piety and earnestness in 
contemporary Western culture, but rather to suggest that recognising such values, whether 
justified or not, is useful. It is certainly evident that making negative judgements about 
celebrities is experienced by many as pleasurable, in the light of Zengotita’s claim about the 
power we feel in choosing to attend or not attend, like or dislike. But value judgements are 
inevitably subjectifying practices as well, and potentially a rationalisation of not contributing to 
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a cause, preserving as they do the sense that one is fundamentally decent – and rightly 
intolerant of self-importance in celebrities. By mocking Geri Halliwell’s appointment as UN 
global ambassador I am able to establish my credentials (if only to myself) as someone who 
believes that integrity and gravitas underpin the appropriate orientation towards human rights, 
a distinction-making exercise that excuses me from more direct demonstrations of political 
commitment. 
The risk in this approach is that in casting celebrities as primarily useful for ourselves, it 
renders them effectively interchangeable, what used to be called floating signifiers into which 
we project whatever it is we are predisposed to project. In some cases there is evidence to back 
this up: show two people of divergent political persuasions the same footage of a speech by 
Barack Obama and they are likely to find confirmation of their existing views on the man and in 
particular his perceived authenticity or inauthenticity (see also Ruddock, 2006; Hay, 2011). 
However, it remains important to be aware of not only the content of a Boris Johnson clip, nor 
just what audiences do with that content, but how they actively engage with this symbolic form 
and why. To return to celebrity advocacy, let us consider the cinema advertisement broadcast in 
2011 in which Ewan McGregor appealed for donations in aid of the relief effort after the 
Japanese earthquake and tsunami. We know enough not to assume or predict reactions to this 
celebrity, and it is true that those who know him chiefly through his role in Star Wars will have a 
different take on the ‘non-acting’ McGregor than fans of Trainspotting. But by looking at the 
choices made in producing this appeal we can gain some insight into what was assumed of 
(cinema) audiences as well as the frames of reference and even symbolic economies that usually 
go unvoiced. The latter term is not meant as a recourse to political economy, but instead to 
point to the often unacknowledged criteria, varying across relational spaces, according to which 
symbolic or cultural value is ascribed. 
 
Figure 1: Ewan McGregor in the UNICEF appeal for survivors of the Japanese earthquake 
and tsunami. Source: YouTube. 
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Whether successful or not, the core of this appeal appears to be a lack of pretence. The choice of 
McGregor is telling: despite being Hollywood A-list his ‘authentic’ or perceived off-screen 
personality is irreverent. A phenomenological analysis would seek to take this to its logical 
conclusion, exploring not just the use of someone unaffected and likeable to front a 
humanitarian campaign, but the broader implication that we are predisposed, or presumed to 
be predisposed, to trust someone who is seen as anti-establishment. That recognition does not 
simply happen, but is learned – at the individual level by a combination of symbolic markers 
from the actor’s facial features and expressions (cheeky, a bit rough around the edges), hair 
(spiky, a little dishevelled and voice (broad Scottish, a choice perhaps not dissimilar to the BBC’s 
recent turn to regional accents in continuity announcements, potentially part of an attempt to 
seem less establishment); and at the cultural level by a shift towards the valorisation of 
unofficial, non-professional authority. The pervading tone of the appeal can be summed up as an 
acknowledgement of the artifice and absurdity of the media most of the time, as well as an 
indication that this is not most of the time: this is real. In part this is achieved through the visual 
design of the appeal – a bare studio with simple white backdrop, white lighting and a clear 
camera filter. This is interesting in itself as it suggests we recognise authenticity in the explicit 
absence of production values – the pointedly empty studio – rather than a setting such as 
outside or at home, where the audience would not be prompted to think about the film’s 
production. This simultaneous drawing of attention to and disavowal of the producedness of the 
appeal might then be thought of as akin to the way authenticity was often indicated in the 
cinematography of the French New Wave, with jump-cuts and awkward camera angles drawing 
attention to the film-making process. In any case it flatters the audience and draws them into a 
relation of complicity: we know that you know that this is a piece of media, and you will 
instinctively and rightly respond with scepticism, but because we’re both in on it we can get 
past the bullshit and cut to the truth. 
The actor is also central to this sense of complicity. In particular, he has a facial expression and 
mode of delivery that is both disarmingly unaffected (lack of affectation being, again, something 
whose performance and recognition has to be learned) and slightly quizzical (his default setting 
has one eyebrow a little raised), which invites an ironic reaction to the appeal. It is not difficult 
to see the intended impact of his performance, again an acknowledgement that usually when 
you see me on screen it is in a film that’s made people like me a lot of money; it is a relentlessly 
commercial industry where someone is always trying to sell you something – but this is 
different. However, this could prompt multiple responses, once more according to what 
different groups of individuals are predisposed to recognise in media, and the uses that this 
recognition serves. Thus, for those instinctively looking for an authentic account of what’s going 
on in the world there may well be a rationalisation of following the culturally legitimate advice 
to follow about what to pay attention to and how to act upon it. For others instinctively primed 
for confirmation of their reflexive, referential relationship with the media, this is what they will 
experience. Interestingly, there seems little scope for a loss of credibility on McGregor’s part – 
he has established both credentials for charity campaigning and a recognised sense of the 
perversity of the film business that insures him against any perception of self-importance. On 
the audience’s part, there is the option of taking pleasure in the invitation of complicity as well 
as declining to answer the appeal to donate right there and then, the knowingness of the 
experience ensuring that one’s own compassionate subjectivity is not challenged. 
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5. Conclusion 
This article has taken seriously the proposition that rather than asking how celebrities can be 
used by humanitarian and social justice campaigns to prompt audiences to take notice and 
potentially act on issues, we need to look more closely at the other side of the equation and ask 
what audiences do with celebrities. Central to this question is orientation: one’s lived relation to 
the world through the repeated, instinctive recognition of positive and negative symbolic value, 
and how it serves to underpin self-presentation and social positioning. But against the 
ethnographic turn in media research, I have argued that there is little volition in orientation. Not 
only do campaigners and celebrity handlers have little agency in shaping the responses 
audiences have to exposure to stars, but audiences too are instinctively predisposed to 
recognise certain symbolic forms and categories rather than others. This is not about the limits 
of image management, however. Even divergent audiences will tend to have their instincts 
confirmed when presented with the same celebrity – instincts about their own identities as 
compassionate or unimpressionable or savvy as much as instincts about the celeb in question. 
But we can go further than this apparently flatly structuralist approach by asking exactly what is 
going on in the mediated encounter between the star and the audience. Complicity appears to 
be the principal feature of this encounter, a recognition of authenticity where such a thing is 
learned and performed by both parties rather than simply being. Complicity is both pleasurable 
and useful, the latter in terms of making sense of our naturalised orientations in relation to 
public life: it affirms the hunch that there is something absurd about the way we relate to and 
through media while clinching our investment in it. But ultimately for those already oriented 
away from public action it can only sustain an ironised distance from the cause being advocated, 
frustrating to the humanitarian campaigner but perhaps no less enjoyable for those in the 
celebrity cluster. 
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2012. http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/meow-meow-the-party-drug-that-fries-your-brain/story-fneszs56-
1226478007544 [accessed 3 September 2013]. 
2 See, for instance, “Joanna Lumley Confronts Stunned Minister Over Gurkha Promises”, theguardian.com, 
8 May 2009.  http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2009/may/08/gurkhas-joanna-lumley-phil-
woolas [accessed 3 September 2013]. 
